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2Context
• The Navy is moving towards an Open Architecture (OA) paradigm 
– Joint interoperable systems that adapt and are built using open interfaces, 
open design principles, and open architectures
• FORCEnet – the Navy’s network centric concept of operations
– The viability, affordability and sustenance of FORCEnet necessitates an 
architecture that is fully compliance with OA technology 
– The development of OA within FORCEnet will result in a superior, adaptive, 
“plug and fight” capability for the modern war-fighter
• Expected long term benefits from Navy OA
– Business benefits: 
• Flexible acquisition strategies and contracts that enable the Navy to reuse 
software, easily upgrade systems, and share data throughout the enterprise
– Technical benefits: 
• Layered and modular open architectures that facilitate portability, maintainability, 
interoperability, upgrade-ability and long-term supportability
3Problem Statement
• Our preliminary investigations indicate that current methods for
achieving dependability in Open Architectures are insufficient
– Navy is currently able to deliver open architecture-based systems 
• However, known methods for achieving dependability with OA are expensive and 
not clearly understood
– According to Navy and other experience, traditional approaches to testing 
are usually unsuitable in open environments
• They are too expensive, take too long and lack agility to react to changes during 
acquisition
• Have to be repeated after every change
• Typical testing assumptions are not valid for Open Architectures
– Conventional methods for testing require that the environment of a typical 
system is fixed and known in detail to the quality assurance team at test 
and evaluation time
• Conventional testing is strongly context dependent
– The effectiveness of testing is very sensitive to the expected operating 
environment, which is unknown for reusable subsystems
– The majority of failures in software systems are due to requirements and 
specification errors, and commonly show up after a subsystem has been 
moved to a different environment
4Objectives
• Reduce testing cost
– Reduce the need for re-testing
– Eventually eliminate integration test after every reconfiguration
• Make testing more effective by augmenting it with other quality 
assurance methods
– Develop conceptually new and different testing methods to achieve 
dependability in Navy OA systems in presence of reuse, 
reconfiguration, changes and unpredictable environments
• Enable Persistent Open Architectures
– The architecture should not have to change or be retested every 
time the system configuration changes
– All architecture changes should be compatible extensions
• Avoid retesting previously existing parts
5Challenges for DoD Testing Approaches
• Navy systems are subject to frequent changes 
– E.g., Many Navy systems seek to provide migrating services and 
reconfiguration of service oriented architectures (SOA)
– Architectural changes impact Key Performance Parameters (KPP), 
availability and other system requirements
• Scenario-based testing is commonly used
– Dependent on a particular system configuration and environment
– Does not currently deal with system modularity
– When the system configuration or environment changes, the 
designed test cases, scenarios and operational profiles also need 
to be changed. 
• A shift from scenario based testing to architecture based testing 
is needed 
6Complexity of testing OA
• An architecture is related to a family of systems, while a design is 
traditionally associated with a single instance of a system
• Assembly of plug compatible components leads to many system 
configurations
– Slots in an open architecture can be filled by different subsystems
• The number of choices for each slot multiplied together lead to an 
astronomical number of possible configurations for Navy systems












• Unbounded number of 
configurations
– An unpredictable number of 
new subsystems can be 
created in the future
– It will be impossible to test all 
configurations
– A majority of the configurations 
will not be tested at all
7Solution Approach
• Refine the open architecture concept to support system 
development and testing with interchangeable software parts
• A Dependable Open Architecture should include:
– Not only components and connections but also constraints
expressing the most important dependability properties
– Links to requirements, capabilities and standards
– Variable parameters – KPP’s / features  
– Components and connectors should be swappable within 
compatibility groups defined by testable dependability properties
• Apply testing at the architectural level, not only at the system
implementation level
8Solution Approach
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9Solution Approach
• Step 1: Identification of dependability contracts
– System wide guarantees and assumptions
• Dependability properties that must hold in all configurations at the system level
• Primarily technical constraints rather than legal documents
– Intended to be checkable/testable via software, also at reconfiguration or runtime
• Improved methods for requirements determination, analysis, representation and 
allocation might be required
– Component requirements
• Component-level dependability contracts for the subsystems and connectors of 
the architecture
• Constraints apply to the architectural connection patterns and subsystem slots 
• Step 2: Testing components vs. standards
– Test each subsystem and connector against its dependability contract
– Automated process to enable sufficient large sets of test cases for 
statistically significant conclusions about desirable dependability levels
– Cost is proportional to the number of components, not number of 
combinations
– Must be done once for each version of each atomic component






• Step 3: Verify architecture vs. requirements 
and standards 
– Check the system-wide dependability 
properties in all possible configurations
vs. the structure of the architecture and 
the dependability contracts for subsystems and connectors
– One-time process that uses symbolic analysis techniques
• Step 4: Ensure non-interference among components
– Check components for non-interference
• Ensure components working correctly in isolation will continue to do so 
when they are connected
– Computer-aided process











• Step 5: Monitor Environment Assumptions 
– Formulate assumptions about the environment as constraints 
attached to the architecture and components
– Check constraints after reconfiguration, e.g., resource limits, 
schedulability, etc.
– Operating environment assumptions checked by runtime 
monitoring, e.g., Built-In-Test(BIT) technology used in DoD systems




Example: craft position control subsystem
• Architecture
– Two component slots
• Software driver for a position sensor (can be filled with a variety of sensors, such 
as GPS, inertial, VOR/DME, etc., )
• Control software module for an autopilot (can be filled with different control 
algorithms)
– One connector 
• Carries information 
about the current 
craft position
• Objective
– Keep the platform on 
course
• Dependability contracts
– Tolerances for the 
sensor accuracy and the 
allowable time delay 
for transmitting 
the position 















• Requirements analysis needs to span the entire problem 
domain and system life, not just individual versions of the 
System of Systems
– Same architecture must support all future versions
– Planned control of variation via ranges for parameters/features
• Re-orient development processes toward Design-to-Tolerances
– Currently oriented  towards Design-to-Fit, Test-to-Fit
• The architecture as a whole needs authority / priority
– Responsible organization
– Global system standards authority
– Manage accountability for subsystems
– Empower via change control, acceptance testing, budget control
14
Acquisition Process Implications
• Architecture development / QA needs substantial 
time/resources/technology development
– Must be included in plan from the start
– More detailed/precise standards and analysis needed
• New QA technologies needed
– Some known in labs but not used currently
– Tailoring/improvement may be needed for practical use
– Some areas need new methods to reach long term goals
– Will need tech transfer and training
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Conclusions
• New approach to quality assurance is better for achieving 
Dependable Open Architecture
– Support rapid reconfiguration without compromising dependability
while remaining economically viable
– Applies to Test & Evaluation in Navy Open Architecture initiative
• Benefits of the proposed methodology:
– Reduction of testing and limited scope for retesting after changes
– Assurance of dependability
• Assurance that all possible configurations derived from the architecture 
can satisfy the stated dependability requirements
• Enables agile dependable reconfiguration and on-the-fly “plug and fight”
• Overall, the proposed methodology will enable achieving 
dependability in Navy OA systems in presence of reuse, 





• As far as we know, there is no similar approach proposed in the 
related literature
• Comparison with Navy’s testing approaches
– Guidelines for testing are scarce and generic, and mainly rely on 
scenario-based approaches
– E.g., testing recommendations in OACE
• Functional and performance testing vs. specified system requirements 
organized as test cases and scenarios 
• Concept of “virtual homogeneity” to facilitate testing by identifying 
compatibility groups of sub-systems performing similarly 
(We define these via dependability constraints and slot standards)
• Concepts of “tree of subsystems” and “aggregations of components”
with no (considerable) interaction between choices of configurations for 
applying test cases 
• Schedulability analysis for ensuring that any configuration is 
schedulable
(A kind of non-interference check)
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Related Work
• Comparison with component based testing
– Can be used in our methodology for testing components vs. 
standards 
• Traditionally performed by a component’s developer before release to 
assure quality (white-box testing approach)
• Also used by system integrators to check that a component works 
correctly in a host system (black-box testing approach) 
– Certification strategies based on component testing
• Combination of black-box testing, system-level fault injection and 
defense protection through wrapping (Voas) 
– Approaches to make component data visible for testing
• Components are usually acquired as black-boxes without access to 
data necessary for (integration) testing
• Reflective techniques can help access the required data (Salles)
– Techniques based on formal methods
• Model checking and theorem proving are traditional formal techniques 
used to test and verify components’ correctness vs. specifications
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Related Work
• Comparison with runtime software reconfiguration
– Used in service-oriented architectures (SOA), air-traffic control 
systems, telephone switching systems, high-availability public 
information systems, etc.
– Variety of technology for Dynamic Software Architectures
• Reconfigurable ADLs (e.g., Dynamic Wright), programming languages 
(e.g., Lisp, Smalltalk, Haskel), dynamic linking libraries, dynamic object 
technology (e.g., CORBA), etc.
– Techniques for developing reconfigurable systems
• Graph transformation methods, hypergraphs, grammar oriented 
programming (GOP), grammar oriented object design (GOOD), etc.
– Techniques for checking reconfigurable systems
• Usually applied to static configurations (model checking, conformance 
testing, etc.)
• Runtime monitoring techniques also used
– Several steps of our approach can benefit from these techniques 
• E.g.: derivation of dependability contracts for reconfiguration, topology 
and connections; verification of the structure of the architecture, 
identification of sources of interference, etc.
